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GENERAL DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND
SUFFERING IN A PERSONAL TORT ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Although pain and suffering are only a portion of the
damages recoverable in an action for a personal injury, they
are one of the more important elements. Vague as these
general damages are, without them there would be no justice.
Therefore, it is the scope of this note to discuss the general
concept of pain and suffering; the method of admeasuring
pain and suffering in the trial court and in appellate practice;
the establishment of pain and suffering; the legal general
damages aspect of pain and suffering; and the applicable jury
instructions pertaining to pain and suffering.
In North Dakota, damages and compensatory relief are a
matter of statute.' Detriment caused by the unlawful act or
omission of another shall be compensated for in money.
2
Detriment is defined by statute as "a loss or harm suffered
in person or property." 3 In an action for detriment, damages
resulting after the commencement thereof or certain to result
in the future are recoverable. 4 "For the breach of an obliga-
tion not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except
when otherwise expressly provided by law, is the amount
which will compensate for all the detriment proximately
caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or
not.' '5 A person entitled to bring an action under the wrong-
ful death statute shall be awarded damages proportionate to
the injury resulting from the death.7 All of the foregoing
North Dakota damage statutes, with the exception of wrong-
ful death, have been derived from the California Civil Code.
Therefore, as much emphasis as possible has been placed on
California and other jurisdictions with similar statutes.
General damages are those which the law presumes to flow
from the tortious act and may be awarded without proof of
1. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03 (1961).
2. N.D. Cent. Code 32-03-01 (1961).
3. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-02 (1961).
4. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-03 (1961).
5. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-20 (1961).
6. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-21-02 (1961).
7. Alexander v. Holmes, 85 Ga. App. 124, 68 S.E.2d 242 (1951).
any specific amount to compensate the plaintiff for the injury
done to him.7 They may be proved under the "ad damnum"
clause.8 If the pleadings are not expressly limited to special
damages, a petition setting forth a tort and claiming un-
specified damages in a stated amount will be construed as
seeking general damages so as to authorize their recovery.,
General damages are damages not resting on any of the appli-
Cable exact methods of computation, but upon facts and cir-
cumstances that permit the jury or the court to estimate in a
general, but in a sufficiently accurate way, the injury to plain-
tiff.10 The defendant is charged with notice of the existence
of general damages and must come into court prepared to
defend in absence of any special pleading." General damages
are the same as compensatory or actual damages.12
II. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF PAIN AND SUFFERING
A. Physical pain and suffering - Since pain and suffering
are by their nature classified as either "physical" or "mental"
they must be distinguished. "Physical" as defined by Webs-
ter's dictionary means "of or pertaining to the body as con-
trasted with the mind." Physical suffering is the suffering
or pain that flows directly from the physical injury.13 The
words "physical pain" do not include mental distress, but
mean bodily suffering, although a strong mental emotion
may produce bodily injury and cause bodily suffering, so
that an instruction allowing recovery for physical pain and
also mental distress would be error, where there is evidence of
mental distress but not of physical pain. 4 Nervousness and
disturbances of the nervous system are physical injuries and
are recognized elements of damage. 5 Unlawful touching of a
person's body, although no actual physical injury ensues
therefrom, constitutes physical injury to a person, since it
violates personal right.16 The term physical injury is the
8. Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., 1 Cal. App.
511. 82 Pac. 562 (1905).
9. Hall v. Browning, 195 Ga. 423, 24 S.E.?d 392 (1943).
10. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Shakespeare Co., 47 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Mich.
1942).
11. Simon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 103 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1937).
12. Ringgold v. Land, 212 N.C. 369, 193 S.E. 267 (1937).
13. McGlone v. Hauger, 56 Ind. App. 243, 104 N.E. 116 (1914).
14. Walker v. Kellar, 218 S.W. 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
15. Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 636, 270 P.2d 942 (1954).
16. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
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synonym of "bodily hurt" or "bodily harm". There must be
some tortious act by which physical injury is occassioned in
order to justify damages for mental distress and fright. Thus
it has been held that there can be no recovery in any case of
mental distress or fright resulting from negligence where
there is no bodily injury contemporaneous therewith. Sick-
ness resulting from fright and mental anger is not a physical
injury within the meaning of this rule.1 7 However, iii
Southern Pacific Ry. v. Bailey,18 the rendering of a passen-
ger on a train nervous almost to sickness, by threatened
ejection, was deemed to constitute a physical injury. A neur-
osis, together with its attendant physical aches and pains, is
a physical injury or illness for which recovery can be had.1 9
B. Mental pain and suffering - "Mental" as used to describe
the condition of a person, should be construed to refer to his
senses, perceptions, consciousness and ideas.2 Mental dis.
turbance and injury of feelings has been defined as "mental
or emotional pain and suffering. '"21 "Mental suffering cons-
titutes an aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues
from the act complained of, and includes fright, nervousness,
grief, anxiety, shock, worry, mortification, humiliation and
indignity, as well as physical pain. ' '22 Mental suffering will
be implied from illness accompanied by physical pain.23 Mental
anguish is a high degree of mental suffering and must be
real and with cause. It cannot be the result of mere dis-
appointment, regret, a too sensitive mind, nor a morbid imagi-
nation. 24  A distinction must be made between "mental suf-
fering" and "impairment of the mental faculties.25 The
17. Dye v. Chicago & A.R.R., 135 Mo. App. 254, 115 S.W. 497 (1909).
18. 91 S.W. 820, 821 (1906).
19. Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
20. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580 (1872).
21. Allison v. Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
22. Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P.2d 389, 396 (1942); Clay v.
Lagias, 143 Cal. App. 2d 441, 299 P.2d 1025 (1956); McGlone v. Hauger, 56
Ind. App..243, 104 N.E. 116, 122 (1914) "An instruction that in assessing the
damages the jury might consider the physical pain and suffering and also
the mental pain and anguish and the shame and humiliation, did not violate
the rule against the assessment of double damages, since, while physical
.suffering is in a sense mental, it is generally understood to mean the
suffering or pain flowing directly from the physical injury, while mental
pain and anguish relate more particularly to the contemplation of the
consequences and result of the injury, and humiliation differs from both in
that it is not wholly personal but is a state of mind generally induced by
the consciousness of the injured party that others are aware of the insult
and wrong suffered."
23. Galveston, H. & S.A. Tty. v. Rubio, 65 S.W. 1126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
24. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Cook, 30 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
25. Gagnier v. Fargo, 12 N.D. 219, 96 N.W. 841 (1903).
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former are presumed and need not be either specially pleaded
or proven while the latter must be both specially pleaded and
proven. Also, to impair the mental faculties means to reduce
the mental powers and this is not the case in mental suffering
which naturally flows from the physical injury.
C. Pain in general - "Pain" and "anguish" are synonymous
when applied to mental conditions; thus, an instruction limit-
ing elements of damages to physical suffering and mental
pain and anguish was not erroneous. 26  Webster defines
"pain" as "mental distress; anxiety; grief; anguish." This
does not necessarily mean physical pain; and will not be held
to mean physical pain in an instruction in a breach of promise
case that personal pain suffered by plaintiff might be con-
sidered by the jury.27 In a personal injury action, the terms
"pain" and "suffering" must not be so restricted as to exclude
the mental phase in authorizing damages for past and future
pain and suffering.28 Damages for "pain" and "suffering"
have been extended to compensate for a decrease in the ability
to work or a decrease in earning capacity.
2 9
"Inasmuch as enforced idleness or diminished ef-
ficiency in offices of labor is calculated to give rise
to mental distress, it is not error to describe the thing
by its effects, and call it pain and suffering. Such
deprivation or impairment can be classed pain and
suffering and the jury may properly be instructed
that the law fixes no other measure than the enlight-
ened conscience of the impartial jurors."' 0
D. Suffering in general - A charge to allow plaintiff a
just, pecuniary compensation for bodily injuries and dis-
abilities and suffering and distress of mind caused by the acts
complained of is not subject to the objection of allowing one
recovery for bodily injuries and another for disabilities, and
one for suffering of mind and another for distress of mind.
The term "suffering" as used in the charge is evidently in-
tended to refer to physical pain, but, if construed to refer to
mental distress, the charge only permits of one recovery for
26. Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 142, 25 P.2d 162 (1933).
27. Robertson v. Craver, 88 Iowa 381, 55 N.W. 492 (1893).
28. Prettyman v. Topkis, 3 A.2d 708 (Del. 1938).
29. Langran v. I-odges, 60 Ga. App. 567, 4 S.E.2d 489 (1939).
30. Atkinson v. Taylor, 13 Ga. App. 100, 78 S.E. 830, 831 (1913) (Syllabus
by the court) (Emphasis added).
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that element of damage.3 1  Suffering in the future from
injury should be distinguished from permanent injury, in
that the former will persist after the trial, but may cease,
while the latter will last throughout life.
32
III. THE STANDARDS USED FOR MEASURING
PAIN AND SUFFERING
A. By the jury - The admeasurement of "pain and suffer-
ing" is an important consideration in this note. Yet, to this
date, not even the medical profession has developed a defi-
nite and proven method of measuring it. Section 32-03-20
of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "The measure
of damages, except when otherwise provided by law, is the
amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi-
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not." This has been specifically applied to "pain and
suffering. ' '13 In the ascertainment of "pain" and "suffering"
the jury must depend upon its common knowledge, good
sense and practical judgement.34  It is not susceptible of
arithmetical calculation35 However, the problem is that
pain and suffering are to be measured in money.
38
In McDonald v. Union Pacific Ry.,. 7 the following
charge was upheld:
"The value that shall be put upon pain and suffer-
ing is left to you, gentlemen; to your own good
common sense and experience; you value that - that
is - from your own knowledge and upon your own
judgment, unaided by witnesses; for the law cannot
call a witness to aid you."
What guides, then, are the jury to have? The attorney,
it would seem, is under an obligation to assist the jury. It is
felt that it is the duty of counsel on both sides in final argu-
ment to use those methods most persuasive in presenting his
side of the case to the jury. Counsel should be permitted to
make deductions from the evidence or inferences reasonably
31. St. Louis S.W. Ry. of Texas v. Highnote, 84 S.W. 365 (Tex. 1904).
32. Colby v. Thompson, 207 S.W. 73 (Mo. 1918).
33. Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1958).
34. 1b1d.
35. Ibid.
36. See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-01 "(1961).
37. 42 Fed. 579, 582 (3d Cir. 1890).
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adduced therefrom.23 The North Dakota Century Code pro-
vides that: "It is the duty of every attorney and counseler
at law to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided in him, such means only as are consistent with truth,
and never seek to mislead the judges (or juries) by any arti-
fice or false statement of fact or law. 3 9 It appears that the
North Dakota Supreme Court has in King v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc.,4 0 seemingly restricted counsel in arguing pain
and suffering to the jury. Other jurisdictions have restricted
the pain and suffering argument of counsel to an even greater
extent.41
B. By the appellate courts - There are various tests applied
by the appellate courts on appeals from excessive damages.
A great percentage of these appeals are taken from awards
given for pain and suffering. The final decision, in all
cases, lies within the discretion of the court. The classical
test was established by Chancellor Kent when he said:
"The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as
to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all
measure unreasonable and outrageous, and such as
manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by
passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. In short,
the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and ex-
travagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the
line; for they have no standard by which to ascertain
the excess.
'4 2
The modern tests have tended to liberalize this rule. Where
an award of damages for personal injuries has been held as
excessive, due to "passion and prejudice" any change in the
cost of living or the purchasing power of money will be con-
sidered in fixing the amount of the remittitur. 4 3 In Calif-
fornia, the test of reference to past cases of similar awards
was tried. However, it was held that such a test is no
38. J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d.786 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
39. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-13-01 (1961) (Words in parenthesis added).
40. 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961).
41. Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 At. 111
(1936). Contra, Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959); Continental
Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
42. Coleman v. Southwick, 6 Am. Dec. 253, 258 (N.Y. 1812).
43. Birmingham Electric Co. 'v. Howard, 250 Ala. 421, 34 So. 2d 830
(1948).
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criteria where the yardstick, the dollar, is not constant.4 4
The jury verdict which includes an amount for pain and
suffering will not be overturned "unless it clearly appears...
the result of inadvertence or intentional or capricious dis-
regard of the evidence, or was infected with bias, passion, or
other improper motive."'4 5 It has also been said that the
verdict must not be beyond the bounds of reason, 6 nor seem
unduly high.
4 7
"In a world so full of pain and suffering it is strange that
no one has perfected a gauge that will accurately measure
its value.
48
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PAIN AND SUFFERING: TESTIMONY
A. By plaintiff - Because of their interest, parties to a civil
suit have been held to be incompetent to testify under the
common law. 9  A party to the record, if willing to do so,
could testify if called by the opposing party, but not against
his own consent.,5 Statutes have been passed specifically pro-
viding that parties, with certain exceptions, are not excluded
as witnesses, 51 and are subject to the general rules of evi-
dence. 5 2 Under a federal statute, the-competency of a witness
to testify in any civil action is declared to be determined by
the laws of the state in which the court is held.
5 3
A party to the action has been held to be an interested wit-
ness whom the jury is not bound to believe54  Either the jury
or the court may rightfully consider the interest of the party
as affecting his credibility; but the testimony of a party, as
that of any other witness, should be believed if it is not
inherently improbable and there is no reasonable basis for
44. Buswell v. City and County of San Francisco, 89 Cal. App. 123, 200
P.2d 115 (1948); Kircher v. Atchison & S.F. Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427,
434 (1948) "It is a matter of common knowledge, and of which judicial no-
tice may be taken, that the purchasing power of the dollar has decreased to
approximately one-half what it was prior to the present inflationary spiral
and the trier of fact should take this factor into consideration in deter-
mining the amount of damages necessary to compensate an injured per-
son for the loss sustained as the result of the injuries suffered."
45. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Howard, supra note 43, at 832.
46. Virginia Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
47. Butts v. Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6 (1938).
48. Texarkana Bus Co. v. Carter, 301 S. W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
49. Cf., Smyth v. Strader, 45 U.S. 404 (1846).
50. Cf., Jones v. Perry, 30 Am. Dec. 430 (1836).
51. Texas v. Chiles, 88 U.S. 388 (1874); State v. Powers, 51 N.J. 432, 17
Atl. 969 (1889); Cockley Mill Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio 270, 79 N.E. 478 (1906).
52. People v. Morrison, 195 N.Y. 116, 88 N.E. 21 (1909).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2506 (1954).
54. Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922).
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doubting it. b5 This includes testimony of a party concerning
his pain and suffering.
There is some conflict of authority as to whether a party,
who is a lay witness, may give testimony as to suffering from
which the jury might infer a causal connection between the
reported condition and the incident or accident unless or until
such causal connection is fully established by medical expert
testimony. The better view is in favor of the admissibility
of such evidence. 6  Thus, the rule permitting lay or non-
expert witnesses to testify to the apparent physical condition
applies to the plaintiff,5 7 and the question of causal connection
remains for the jury upon a consideration of the evidence,
including that of the physician and that of all the other lay
witnesses.58 It is a good policy for plaintiff's counsel to have
the plaintiff take the stand in most instances. However, all
of the facts and circumstances would have to be considered in
each individual case. The exceptions would be where the
injured plaintiff might have had many prior accidents, or
where he may just make a poor witness. Defense counsel may
argue to and convince the jury that a plaintiff is "claims
minded."5 9
B. By other lay witnesses - As a general rule, non-profes-
sional witnesses have been permitted to testify as to the
severity of the pain suffered by one who has been under their
observations.6 0  The rule admitting such evidence is one of
necessity,61 and should be applied with liberality so as not to
obstruct justice "by narrow and finical rulings." 62  A lay
witness has been allowed to testify that the plaintiff suffered
"very much" and "very greatly. 6 3 A nurse of the plaintiff
can testify as to the extent of his suffering without qualifying
as an expert.64  Where the bodily and mental feelings of a
55. Kelly v. Jones, 290 I1. 375, 125 N.E. 334 (1919).
56. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. McCullers, 189 Va. 89, 52 S.E.2d 257 (1949).
57. International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 293 Ill. 524,
127 N.E. 703 (1920).
58. Miasouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. of Texas v. Anderson, 258 S.W.2d 375
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
59. Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'n, Inc., 127 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
60. Baltimore & O.R.RP v. Rambo, 59 Fed. 75 (6th Cir. 1893); Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Griggs, 48 Ga. App. 585, 173 S.E. 194 (1954); Enos v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 S.D. 639, 57 N.W. 919 (1894).
61. Village of Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio 549, 22 N.E. 407 (1889).
62. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 568 (3d ed. 1940).
63. Heddles v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 77 Wis. 228, 46 N.W. 115 (1890).,
64. Kimball v. Northern Electric Co., 179 Cal. 225. 113 Pac. 156 (1911).
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person are to be proved, the usual and natural expressions
and exclamations of such persons which are the spontaneous
manifestations of pain, and naturally flow from the pain
being suffered by him at the time, are competent and original
evidence, which may be testified to by any party in whose
presence they are uttered.65
C. By expert testimony - An expert witness may properly
show pain by expressing his opinion as to whether pain comp-
plained of by one whom he has attended or examined is real
or feigned.66 It is clearly competent for the expert to give an
opinion as to pain from the general appearance, actions, and
looks of the patient and what he says at the time in regard
to his condition 7 A doctor may testify to the severity of pain
based upon his observations .6  However, it has been held
that, according to the better authorities, statements of a sick
or injured person to his medical attendant as to his present
pains and bodily condition are admissible only when the
medical attendant is called upon to give an expert opinion
based in part upon them.69
V. THE LEGAL GENERAL DAMAGES ASPECT OF
PAIN AND SUFFERING
A. Past pain and suffering - Past pain and suffering in-
cident to injury or surgical procedure and medical treatment
is compensable as an element of damages for personal injury.
70
"Pain and suffering are substantive losses. ... [A
person is] guaranteed freedom from physical and
sensory torment. Pain and suffering while existing
can be as much a disability as a crippling rupture, or
dismemberment. It is the jury's duty to appraise the
pain and the agony of an anatomy in discord and to
affix monetarily the responsibility of the person or
legal entity which broke nature's harmony." 71
B. Future pain and suffering - Future pain and suffering
are compensable.72 It is in this area that difficulties arise
65. Williams v. Great Northern R.R., 68 Minn. 55, 70 N.W. 860 (1897).
66. Quaife v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 2 Wis. 234, 4 N.W. 658 (1880); see
Hintz v. Wagner, 25 N.D. 110, 140 N.W. 720 (1913).
67. Ibid.
68. Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 37 Ind. App. 262, 76
N.E. 816 (1906).
69. Sund v. Chicago ]I. & P. By., 164 Minn. 24, 204 N.W. 628 (1925).
70. Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917). Sears
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 169 N.C. 446, 86 S.E. 176 (1915):
71. Burgan v. City of Plttsburg, 373 Pa. 608, 96 A.2d 889, 891 (1953).
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since the law imposes upon the doctor's prognosis (future
diagnosis) the test of reasonable certainty to what is at the
most only a probability.73 When such a test has been met,
life expectancy tables may properly be introduced.
74
The money for this phase of general damages may have
to be reduced by the jury to present worth. In a wrongful
death action, several states hold that the trial court in in-
structing as to the amount of recovery in respect to the loss
of future pecuniary benefit should limit it to its present
worth - cash value.7 5 However, in other jurisdictions a dis-
tinction is drawn between the reduction to present worth of
damages for impaired earning capacity and those awarded for
future pain and suffering. Some courts hold broadly that
the trial judge must7 6 or may7 7 properly instruct the jury to
reduce all damages awarded for prospective loss to their pres-
ent worth. However, many states are against reducing
damages for prospective pain and suffering.78 The better
rule is that damages flowing from impairment of earning
capacity should be reduced to present worth.7 9  It has been
held that the failure to instruct on present worth was not
error where a reasonable verdict was returned."0 Aggrava-
tion of the consequences of a personal injury by the use of
opiates is compensable.8 1
C. Mental pain and suffering - The "mental pain and suf-
fering" discussed herein is accompanied by physical injury.
However, both past and future mental pain and suffering
is a separate element of damages, and one need not sue for
the physical suffering. 2 Under the "ad damnum" clause, or
general allegation of damages, a plaintiff may prove and
72. Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295 Pac. 780 (1931); Varley
v. Motyl, 139 Conn. 138. 90 A.2d 869 (1952).
73. Ibid. See also Infra notes 92-97 and text.
74. LePage v. Theberge, 89 A.2d 534 (N.H. 1952).
75. Chesapeake & 0, Ry. v. Kelly, Adm'rx, 241 U.S. 485 (1916); Andrews
v. Y.M.C.A. of Des Moines, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939); Brown v.
Erie R.R., 87 N.J.L. 487, 91 Atl. 1023 (1914).
76. Gleason v. Lowe, 232 Mich. 300, 205 N.W. 199 (1925); Parker v.
Roberts, 99 Vt. 219, 131 Atl. 21 (1925).
77. Ingebretson v. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R., 176 Iowa 74, 155 N.W. 327
(1915).
78. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 28 Fed. 881 (8th Cir. 1922); Georgia
Power Co. v. Woodall, 43 Ga. App. 172, 158 S.E. 367 (1931); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S.W. 763 (1924); LeVan v. McLean, 276
Pa. 361, 120 Atl. 395 (1923).
79. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Farr, 56 Fed. 994 (8th Cir. 1893); Clark v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 129 Iowa 358, 105 N.W. 651 (1906).
80. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tollett, 178 Ark. 199, 10 S.W.2d 5 (1928).
81. Pyke v. City of Jamestown, 15 N.D. 157, 107 N.W. 359 (1906).
82. Dimmick v. Follis, 11 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. 1953).
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recover all damages naturally and necessarily resulting from
the act complained of, and it is not necessary that these be
pleaded.
83
An interesting California case, Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas
& Electric Co.,8 4 considered the problem of the component
parts compensable under the entire injury. The court stated:
"We think that mental worry, distress, grief, mor-
tification, where they are shown to exist, are prop-
erly component elements of that mental suffering for
which the law entitles the injured party to redress in
monetary damages. It is mere self-stultification to
believe that it will do other than make up its verdict
under the rule which, while not one of law, is one of
well-nigh universal human conduct; the rule of 'put
yourself in his place'. Each juror will consider how
he would feel under like circumstances, and he will
not narrow his contemplation to the mere matter of
physical suffering under the direction of any court.
So that in fact verdicts always have and always will
be rendered from this point of view."
Other courts have denied recovery for distress of mind and
mortification, because of their uncertainty and speculative-
ness.s 5
D. Embarrassment, ridicule and humiliation - Embarrass-
ment, ridicule and humiliation are held to be separate items
for damages in many cases wherein there has been physical
and/or mental injury due to negligence on the part of the
defendant. Compensation has been allowed for such injuries
due to distress and anxiety from disfigurement, humiliation
because of facial scars, annoyance from deformities, and for
mortification.-s Concerning humiliation, a consideration for
the jury is whether or not one who has been deprived of a
member in infancy is likely to feel as much humiliation from
it as one who sustains the loss later in life. This is due to
mechanical aids which are now so highly developed; and
83. Arenson v. Butterworth, 243 Iowa 880, 54 N.W.2d 557 (1952); Hen-
drickson v. New Hughes Jellico Coal Co., 172 Ky. 568, 189 S.W. 704 (1916).
84. 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534, 540 (1910).
85. Linn v. Duquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551, 54 AtU. 341 (1903).
86. See, e.g., Harrod v. Bisson, 48 Ind. App. 549, 93 N.E. 1093 (1911);
Pestotnik v: Balliet, 233 Iowa 1047, 10 N.W.2d 99 (1943); Coombs v. King,
107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468 (1910); Sherwood v. Chicago & W.M. Ry., 82 Mich.
374, 46 N.W. 773 (1890).
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which may enable the infant to overcome his humiliation
over the years.
8 7
E. Conscious pain and suffering in a wrongful death action
Some jurisdictions allow an award for conscious pain and
suffering in addition to the wrongful death damages from the
same tort.8   Others do not, reasoning that under the ordinary
death statute, in which the award is to the parents or the
next of kin of the deceased minor or the wife or husband of
the deceased spouse, no award can be made for the decedent's
pain and suffering resulting from the fatal injury.8 9 The
North Dakota statute states that: . . ." in an action brought for
wrongful death, the jury shall give such damages as it finds
proportionate to the injury resulting from the death to the
persons entitled to recovery." 90  Thus, in North Dakota, it
seems that these elements of damage could be recoverable and
should be included in the prayer, trial, and argument as it
may warrent a considerable recovery. However, even where
by statute, there may be a recovery for mental suffering
after the injury and prior to the death, in a combined action
for death and personal injuries, there can be no recovery for
decedent's terror, fright or mental suffering preceding the
injury that caused death.9 1 When the death is instantaneous,
there can be no recovery whatsoever for pain and suffering,
fright or terror.
F. Damages must be probable - Most states have promul-
gated general statutory regulations for damages, such as
California's provision: "Damages may be awarded, in a
judicial proceeding, for detriment resulting after the com-
mencement thereof, or certain to result in the future" 92 Under
this statute the jury must be instructed that they may assess
damages for only such pain and suffering as they are certain
will result in the future; but the words "reasonably certain",
"will", and "necessarily" are held to be a substantial com-
87. Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
88. Hines v. Johnson, 151 Ark. 549, 236 S.W. 835 (1922); Love v. Detroit J
& C.R.R., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912); Marinkovich v. Tierney, 93 Mont.
72, 17 P.2d 93 (1932).
89. Bond v. United R.R. of San Francisco, 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366
(1911); Sutherland v. State, 189 Misc. 953, 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1947); Tufty v.
Sioux Transit Co., 69 S.D. 368, 10 N.W.2d 767 (1943).
90. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-21-02 (1961) (See annotations).
91. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 53, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944)
(Emphasis added).
92. Cal. Civ. Code § 3283 (1954).
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pliance with the requirement of the statute. However, the use
of such words as "may"0 3 and "reasonably probable '' 94 have
been held to be erroneous.
In North Dakota, where our statute is phrased exactly the
same, 95 the word "certain" therein has been construed to
have been used not in its absolute sense, the statute being
satisfied by the definite phrase "reasonably certain. '96  In
contrast, an instruction on damages "the pain he has suffered
or may be likely to suffer in the future" was held error.
97
VI. CONCLUSION
It is to be noted that the facts of each particular case will
determine the particular instructions that are to be given.
Also, since the North Dakota damage statutes are mainly
derived from the California Civil Code, a good source is the
Book of Approved California Jury Instructions. This set
provides annotations along with alternative instructions for
varying fact situations.
The underlying reason for pain and suffering general
damages is an attempt to place the injured party back into
the position he was before he incurred his detriment. This
is left entirely to the discretion of the jury, the trial court,
and the appellate courts. I would conclude that this is a
matter of good common sense, but I feel that every factor
should be considered. One important consideration that is
mysteriously missing is the attorney's fee. Except on rare
occasions, the personal injury cases are always tried on the
contingent fee basis. This automatically reduces the plain-
tiff's judgment by one-third. However, the jury bases its
verdict on their concept of equity to the injured. For example,
where the party is permanently injured and unable to work
for the rest of his life, the money he receives will have to
last him the rest of his life to support himself and his family
unless, in the case of a married person, the other
spouse can work; or there is some other income avail-
able. Here again, these are factors to consider. However,
93. York v. General Utilities Corp., 51 N.D. 137, 170 N.W. 312 (1918).
94. Richman v. San Francisco N. & C. Ry., 180 Cal. 454, 181 Pac. 769
(1919).
95. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-03 (1961).
96. Larson v. Russell, 45 N.D. 33, 176 N.W. 998 (1920).
97. York v. General Utilities Corp.. supra note 93.
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the present rules of law forbid the mentioning of either the
attorney's fee or the personal financial worth of the plaintiff
or the defendant during the course of the trial. Both of
these rules are well founded and seem to stand on solid
ground.
The conclusions, then, seem to be threefold. First, the
attorney should be given the full latitude in his argument of
pain and suffering to the jury. His conduct should be left
to the discretion of the trial court based upon the evidence.
Second, the trial court should include every factor in its con-
siderations on the motions after trial. This should include
the marital status of the plaintiff, the size of his. family, his
financial worth, the type of injury, and the attorney's fee, to
name a few. Third, on appeal, these findings of the trial
court should be submitted with the record for the considera-
tion of the appellate court. Also, the appellate court should
apply a very stringent test such as that laid down by Chan-
cellor Kent.
RONALD SCHMIDT
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